Still keeping secrets? The DA-Notice system post 9/11 by Sadler, Pauline
In the BBC series ‘Yes Minister’ Sir Arnold Robinson,the Cabinet Secretary, comments: ‘My dear boy, it is a
contradiction in terms: you can be open or you can have
government.’1 The DA-Notice system, which operates
only in the UK, represents an extra legal way of effecting
some balance between government secrecy (here invoked
in the name of national security) and open government (or
freedom of speech). The DA-Notice system had its genesis
in the formation of the Joint Standing Committee
(Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee) in 1912.2
The Committee, which oversees the operation of the DA-
Notice system, is today called the Defence Press and
Broadcasting Advisory Committee (DPBAC). The DA-
Notice system is a voluntary extra-legal arrangement
between the government and the media where the media
agree not to publish certain information in the interests of
national security. The arrangement, described as ‘uniquely
British’, remained secret until its existence was revealed in
Parliament in May 1961.3 A similar system operated in
Australia between 1952 and 1982.4
The purpose of this article is to compare the opera-
tion of the DA-Notice system before and after the events
of September 11, 2001, including the invasion of Iraq, to
see if there are any differences. The period post 2001
somewhat of a watershed not only because national secu-
rity, in the form of terrorism, was thrust to the forefront of
media attention, but also because of the rapidly increasing
use of new technology to record and disseminate news.5
Brief history of the DA-Notice system
The minutes of one of the first meetings of the Joint
Standing Committee, held in January 1913, set out two
matters of concern to the press side:
‘… While agreeing, on behalf of the Press that
the publication of information of a secret or
confidential character relating to naval and mil-
itary subjects should thus be liable to prohibi-
tion, the Press members stipulated that the Joint
Committee should not be used as a medium for
the dissemination of false information, or for
the purpose of stifling criticisms of policy, or,
except in really important cases where national
interests were at stake, for the restriction of
news. They also made repeated representations
on a point, disregard of which, they urged,
would jeopardize the continuance of any
friendly arrangement. They pressed most
strongly the importance of avoiding
favouritism in the distribution of news to
journals; all papers should be treated on an
equality without distinction made by any
authority … ’6
The issue that the system would be used to suppress mate-
rial that is not genuinely prejudicial to the interests of
national security has remained contentious. There has
been in the past the suspicion on occasion that the sup-
pressed material has had more to do with revelations that
would embarrass the incumbent government.
The tension between keeping information secret in
the interests of national security and the media’s interest in
providing news of current events has a history that
stretches back through the nineteenth century. During the
Peninsular War (1808–14) the Duke of Wellington had
cause to complain that the newspapers in England were
giving an advantage to the French by openly publishing
information about his troop movements.7 During the
Crimean War (1854–56) The Times exposed the inadequa-
cies of English military equipment, and in 1884 the Pall
Mall Gazette reported similar problems in the navy.8 The
English newspapers in 1898 published details of the ‘com-
position of garrisons of all home defended ports … the
existence of submarine defences at Portsmouth, Falmouth
and other ports …’, and in 1899 at the start of the Boer
War three newspapers in England gave full details of
British troop strengths on the day of publication in the
camp at Dundee in North Natal.9
In the first decade of the twentieth century the issue
of instituting formal press censorship simmered under the
surface. Statutory censorship of the press in wartime had
been considered in 1899 and 1905, and rejected on both
occasions for fear of the political consequences arising
from press opposition.10 Press censorship came to the fore
again in 1911 following the publication of an article in the
Morning Post entitled ‘Guardianship of British Forts’
which detailed the defences of many of the fortifications
on the East Coast of England.11
During 1912 two conferences were held with repre-
sentatives of the press and service representatives present.
The conferences were followed by the formation of the
Joint Standing Committee (Admiralty, War Office and
Press Committee) which was to be a friendly arrangement
between the press and the government, in which the
former would submit to voluntary censorship. Such an
arrangement was intended to, and did, circumvent the dif-
ficulty of imposing statutory censorship on the press.12 As
it was a voluntary system, and not connected directly with
any statute, there was no need for Parliamentary approval.
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Indeed the system was secret and neither Parliament
generally, nor the public, knew of the arrangement until
May 1961 when Harold Macmillan, then Prime Minister,
was forced to acknowledge its existence in answer to a
question in the House of Commons.13 A comment made in
reference to the Australian D-Notice system is equally
apposite here: ‘It is the ultimate in censorship to conceal
the very existence of a system of censorship however
informal it might be.’14
There have been several name changes between 1912
and 2007. The more significant are as follows: in 1918 the
system became known as the Admiralty, War Office, Air
Ministry and Press Committee, to reflect the emergence of
the Air Force; sometime shortly after 1945 it became
known as the Services, Press and Broadcasting Com-
mittee, to reflect the emergence of the broadcast media,
and in 1970 it became known as the Defence, Press and
Broadcasting Committee. In 1993 it became known as the
Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee,
and also in 1993 D-Notices became DA-Notices (Defence
Advisory Notices) – these are the names that remain cur-
rent in 2007.15
It seems to be commonly accepted now that the ‘D’
in D-Notices, or DA-Notices, stands for defence, but this
may not have originally been the case. A letter written in
1932 by C Robertson of the Air Ministry Press Section
gives an alternative explanation:
‘[T]he Press Bureau issued during the War
several kinds of notices, each class having a
different letter. There were “A” notices and so
on. The letter “D” happened to be allotted to
“Parker” messages. It has no significance and
does not stand (as I once thought myself) for
the word “Defence” although it is, on that
account, rather appropriate.’16
Books were not included until 1937, which is well into the
history of the system.17 This late inclusion is of note given
that in the late 1990s books formed a large part of the
workload of the secretary of the DPBAC.18 Given the con-
cerns expressed in the minutes of 1913, quoted earlier,
also of interest is that the list of recipients of D-Notices
was at times selective. Between 1945 and 1952 there were
ongoing discussions at meetings of the Committee as to
the status of the Daily Worker, the Communist Party news-
paper. It seems that from 1945 the D-Notices were circu-
lated to the Daily Worker, but the Committee was
concerned that the information therein would be passed on
to the Soviet Union. Minutes of a meeting in April 1952
indicate that the question of inclusion or otherwise of the
Daily Worker had been referred to the government which
recommended that certain D-Notices be withheld from the
newspaper.19
The end of World War II brought about a significant
change to the Committee. Until 1938 the secretary of the
Committee had been from the press side, but from 1945
onwards the secretary has been a retired high ranking
member of the services.20 By 1962 the chair of the
Committee was the Permanent Under Secretary of
Defence. These changes marked a subtle shift in emphasis
from the press side to the government side.
Originally there were numerous D-Notices which
covered different matters on an ad hoc basis. A document
dated January 1937 reported that ‘the total number of
Notices issued to date is approximately 890’.21 These
notices covered specific issues. For example, a D-Notice
was issued just before the outbreak of war in August 1914
asking the press not to discuss firing experiments being
conducted by HMS Hood, and another requested that there
be no publication of details about the movement of ships,
aircraft and troops without first seeking advice from the
relevant department.22 Over time the number of notices
has been progressively reduced and they now cover
general issues rather than specifics. There were 12 notices
in 1971, eight by 1989, six by 1993, finally reduced to five
in 2000.23 The five that are current at present are as
follows:
DA-Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabi-
lities
DA-Notice 02: Nuclear & Non-Nuclear Weapons &
Equipment
DA-Notice 03: Ciphers & Secure Communications
DA-Notice 04: Sensitive Installations & Home
Addresses
DA-Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelli-
gence Services and Special Services24
During the 1960s there was a series of high profile events
that involved D-Notices. One of these was the ‘Naval Spy
Ring’ case in early 1961 where Gordon Lonsdale, Harry
Houghton, Ethel Gee and Morris and Lona Cohen (alias
Peter and Helen Kroger) were prosecuted with offences
under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 for which
all five were found guilty. The government wanted to bal-
ance maximum exposure of the trial with the need to keep
certain matters secret, so a D-Notice was sent out regard-
ing the proceedings. This case contrasts with the trial a
short time later in May 1961 of George Blake, an officer of
MI6 who spied for the Soviet Union, also for espionage
under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. Blake
pleaded guilty. Before the trial a D-Notice was issued
requesting the media to downplay the trial. According to
Chapman Pincher:
‘Much of the effort made by Macmillan and his
government to blanket the horrific details of
Blake’s treachery was to conceal from the
British public the inefficiency which had
allowed such a spy to operate for so long inside
the Secret Service. The main objective, however,
was to conceal the facts from the US congress
after the Fuchs and Maclean cases had already
done so much damage to the reputation of Britain
as a safe ally with whom to share secrets.’25
Both reasons therefore had more to do with preventing
revelations that were embarrassing for the government
rather than the fear of exposing anything that was gen-
uinely prejudicial to national security. Interestingly while
the British media complied with the D-Notice, foreign
newspapers, available in the UK, did not. This resulted in
the issuing of a second D-Notice requesting that the
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British media did not repeat the information suppressed by
the first D-Notice that had been published in the foreign
press. It was at about the same time, in May 1961, that the
existence of the D-Notice system was revealed for the first
time in Parliament, as mentioned earlier.
In 1967 the ‘Cable Vetting Sensation’ marked a low
point in the operation of the D-Notice system as far as the
government was concerned. The defence correspondent
for the Daily Express, Chapman Pincher, learnt that all
cables leaving England for overseas were first vetted by
the Ministry of Defence. Pincher followed the story up
with various government officials, and also checked with
Colonel Leslie Lohan, then secretary of the Services Press
and Broadcasting Committee. Pincher and Lohan were
long-standing friends and it became obvious that there was
a misunderstanding about what had transpired. Pincher
thought that no D-Notice applied, and Lohan that he had
carried out the instructions he had been given by the
Foreign Office to suppress the story. The story was pub-
lished in the Daily Express on February 21, 1967.26 Harold
Wilson, then Prime Minister, said in Parliament that he
was convinced there had been a deliberate breach of two
D-Notices, and the system was not working. Pincher
responded the next day in the Daily Express, to which the
Prime Minister replied in Parliament the day after that.
The acrimony continued until February 28, 1967 when the
Prime Minister advised Parliament that Lord Radcliffe
would chair a Committee of Privy Councillors (the
Radcliffe Committee) formed to investigate the incident.27
Colonel Lohan resigned before the Radcliffe Committee
reported in May 1967.
In the event the Radcliffe Committee found no
breach of any D-Notices, nor any attempt to evade or defy
the procedure.28 Not happy with this outcome the govern-
ment simultaneously released a White Paper rejecting in
particular the finding that there had been no breach of the
D-Notices.29 A heated debate on these happenings took
place in Parliament in June 1967, the Prime Minister main-
taining his preference of the findings in the White Paper
over the findings of the Radcliffe Committee Report, and,
in doing so, making a personal attack on Colonel Lohan.30
In July 1967 the matter was debated in the House of Lords
during which Lord Radcliffe was scathing in his attack on
the actions of the government. Lord Radcliffe’s participa-
tion in these proceedings was unusual in itself.31 He said:
‘… Of course, even the Government cannot
“reject” a Report that has been made by a
Committee set up for the purpose. The Report
stands; though the Government can say that
they do not agree with it. You might say that
you did not agree with the result of last year’s
Cup Final, and that the referee had given the
wrong decision. But it would not be much use
saying that you rejected it – even if you had a
loyal vote to support you.’32
There were a number of other notable events during the
course of the 1960s,33 but one that occurred in 1970 is
worthy of examination as it again concerns material that
appeared to be politically sensitive rather than sensitive to
national security. In a report entitled An Appreciation of
the Nigerian Conflict the Defence Advisor to the High
Commission in Lagos had assessed the situation in the
Biafran war, and in doing so had been critical of the role of
the Nigerian army which at the time was being supplied
arms by the British. Jonathan Aitken, at the time a journa-
list and aspiring politician, had been given a copy of the
report, unaware that it was confidential. Aitken had
offered the story to the Sunday Telegraph via a literary
agent, with the proceeds to go to charity. The Sunday
Telegraph ran the story in January 1970, having first
cleared it by telephone with Vice Admiral Sir Norman
Denning, then secretary of the Defence, Press and
Broadcasting Committee, who advised it was not subject
to a D-Notice because it referred to the forces of a foreign
power. Aitken took this as giving the story legal immunity,
but when the Nigerians expelled Scott and an enquiry into
the leak ensued, Aitken was charged under section 2(2) of
the Official Secrets Act 1911. Also charged were the editor
of the Sunday Times, Brian Roberts, the Sunday Telegraph
Ltd and Colonel Douglas Cairns who was suspected of
having passed the report to Aitken’s contact. All the
accused were acquitted by the jury after a three and a half
week trial.34 The judge, Caulfield J, criticised the operation
of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. He pointed
out in his summing up that the section should be replaced
with one that enabled people such as the defendants:
‘[T]o determine without any great difficulty
whether a communication by any one of them
or a certain piece of information originating
from an official source, and not concerned in
the slightest with national security, is going to
put them in peril of being enclosed in a dock
and facing a criminal charge …’35
The Aitken case caused great consternation in the press
because previously the media had thought that clearance
from the secretary of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting
Committee would give immunity from prosecution under
the Official Secrets Act. There are two differing views on
this – one being that there is no purpose in having such a
Committee if clearance does not give immunity. The other
view is that the type of material covered by DA-Notices
(or D-Notices as they were then) and the Official Secrets
Act (and the more recent legislation covering terrorism,
for example) may overlap in part, it is not identical in all
respects. Although information may not be subject to a
DA-Notice, it is nevertheless still possible for it to be
subject to statutory prohibition.36
1980 criticisms of the DA-Notice system
The first time a committee of the Parliament reviewed the
D-Notice system as a whole was at the end of 1970s, when
the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence (the
Defence Committee) took a close look at the operation of
the system. The Defence Committee took evidence from a
number of witnesses, publishing its report in August 1980.
As a result of the evidence the report contained four main
criticisms. The first was that the D-Notice system operated
as a form of censorship, and of a rather general nature so
there was an impression of ‘the government seeking to
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prohibit public discussion of defence matters across a very
wide area.’37 The second criticism was that participation in
the D-Notice system compromised press freedom. While
most of the evidence reflected acceptance of the system,
this was a view held strongly by a minority of the corpo-
rate media witnesses who submitted evidence (represent-
ing some of the publications with an interest in defence
matters, such as the New Statesman). It was also the view
held by several individual journalists.38
The third criticism centred on the confusion between
the operation of the D-Notice system and the operation of
the Official Secrets Act – clearance from the former giving
no immunity from the latter, for example the Aitken case
mentioned above, and defiance of the former not necessar-
ily resulting in prosecution under the latter. The fourth
criticism was that the D-Notice system was no longer serv-
ing the purpose for which it was created. The Defence
Committee did, however, see a continuing role for the D-
Notice system but recommended some changes, in parti-
cular that the secretary should be ‘seen to be the servant of
the whole Committee and not just of the Ministry of
Defence’.39 Because of the criticisms in the report the
secretary did in fact become more a servant of the
Committee as a whole, and in addition the D-Notices were
rewritten and no longer classified as ‘confidential’.
DA Notice system and the law
The secretary of the DPBAC does not give legal advice to
the journalists seeking information about whether or not
material is sensitive because it relates to national security.
As noted above, the various secretaries were initially from
the press side until 1945 and since then the secretary has
been a retired high ranking member of the services. This is
because such a person has either the knowledge or the con-
tacts to make a proper assessment of the sensitivity of the
information in relation to national security and the poss-
ible flow on consequences of publication. Neither the sec-
retary, nor the Committee, has ever been in a position to
give legal advice. This was reiterated during a discussion
on the Terrorism Act 2006 in the DPBAC meeting held on
November 15, 2006:
‘The Secretary reported that the absence of
authoritative guidance, either on the wording of
the statute itself or of relevant case law, made it
impractical at present for the DPBAC to offer
even general advice to the UK media on the
implications of the Terrorism Act 2006. Even
when sufficient case law existed, it would mark
a major departure for the DPBAC to attempt to
offer advice on the law, one which might call
into question its independent status and for
which it is neither qualified nor had a mandate.’40
From the perspective of the government, particularly in
the historical context, a major weakness of the system has
been its voluntary nature, allowing the media the choice of
publishing material which the government would prefer to
have suppressed. Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act
1911, as amended in 1920, and its replacement in the
Official Secrets Act 1989, has in the past occasionally
been used in addition to, or as an alternative to, the DA-
Notice system, as seen in the case of Jonathan Aitken dis-
cussed above. While the criminal law has rarely been used
against the media in this context, the mere threat of prose-
cution may deter publication as the media apply self-
censorship. When a criminal prosecution does take place,
however, it usually occurs after the event of publication,
so the material still enters the public domain which is con-
trary to the wishes of the government. It is unlikely that an
injunction, a civil remedy, would be granted to restrain a
criminal act.41 A criminal trial also results in further pub-
licity which is likely to be adverse to the government when
media defendants are involved.
From the late 1970s the government turned to the
civil action of breach of confidence because this provides
pre publication suppression in the form of an injunction.
The best example is the extraordinary litigation surround-
ing the book Spycatcher written by former MI5 officer
Peter Wright (co-authored with Paul Greengrass).42 At the
time the book was written Wright was living in Australia.
The book was a memoir, containing details about Wright’s
time with MI5, classic D-Notice material, and included
much that did not reflect well on the operation of the
Security Service. When The Observer and The Guardian
started publishing extracts, the government took action on
the grounds that it was not in the interest of national secu-
rity for the information to be disseminated. The govern-
ment was granted interlocutory injunctions in breach of
confidence against the respective newspapers restraining
further publication of the extracts, pending trial where the
government sought permanent injunctions.
A parallel series of cases then began against The
Independent and other newspapers for contempt of court
when they published material in defiance of the injunc-
tions against The Observer and The Guardian. Both series
of cases eventually found their way to the House of Lords,
in the case of the breach of confidence actions more than
once. During the course of the proceedings, however, the
book was published in the US, and because people were
able to bring it back into the UK the material was no
longer confidential. The House of Lords when hearing the
appeal with respect to the trial of the issues in breach of
confidence discharged the injunctions because the avail-
ability of the book overseas had destroyed the confiden-
tiality of the information.43
One further advantage to a government bringing
legal action is that both civil and criminal proceedings
may be subject to suppression orders, so that the public is
unaware even that the matter is pending. Suppression
orders are hotly contested by the media, especially if they
are directly involved to their disadvantage, for example
where they wish to publish something to which a govern-
ment objects. By their very nature it is not possible to
know how many cases remain unknown beyond the parties
concerned due to suppression orders.44
The current operation of the DA-Notice
system
The DPBAC has a comprehensive website which appears
to be updated on a regular basis. The website contains
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information about the individual DA-Notices, the
Committee members, the secretary, the operation of the
system, a brief history, records (minutes of meetings),
articles and speeches, the agenda of forthcoming meetings
and FAQs.45 The present DPBAC consists of the
Chairman, Bill Jeffrey CB, who is the Permanent Under
Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, and the Vice-
Chairman (Chairman, Press and Broadcasting Side) R
Hutchinson, who is the editorial policy adviser to Jane’s
Information Group. There are four government members,
representing the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Cabinet
Office, and there are 13 press and broadcasting members
(including Hutchinson), nine from the print media and
four from the broadcast media. The full time secretary,
since December 2004, is Air Vice-Marshall Andrew
Vallance CB OBE, and the Deputy Secretary is Air
Commodore David Adams. Vallance is ‘employed as a
Civil Servant on the budget of the Ministry of Defence’.
The stated purpose of the Committee is to oversee ‘a
voluntary code which operates between those Government
departments which have responsibilities for national secu-
rity and the media; using as its vehicle the DA-Notice
system’.46
The Committee meets twice a year, usually in spring
and autumn, at which the secretary presents a report cov-
ering the period since the previous meeting. If necessary,
the DA-Notices are updated. Between the meetings the
secretary is available at all times to provide advice to
members of the media on the ‘application of a DA-Notice
to a particular set of circumstances … consulting as neces-
sary with appropriate departmental officials. He is not
invested with the authority to give rulings nor to advise on
considerations other than national security’.47
In his report of November 15, 2006 Vallance noted
that there had been 88 enquiries in the previous six
months. Media interest ‘was focussed predominantly on
five areas of defence and security: Special Forces (SF),
UK operations in Iraq and also in Afghanistan, the security
agencies and counter terrorism’.48 The report of June 19,
2007 showed the level of enquiries had increased
markedly to 161. The issues included such matters as ‘UK
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan’, ‘Aerial and Satellite
Photography’ (which will be referred to again later), ‘The
Security Agencies’, ‘Counter-Terrorism’, ‘The Britons
kidnapped in Ethiopia’ and ‘The Planned Operational
Deployment of Prince Harry to Iraq’.49
In May 2006 Vallance was one of the speakers at the
4th International Conference for the Information
Commissioners, hosted in Manchester by the UK
Information Commissioner. In his address, entitled
Secrecy vs Security; the Jigsaw Effect, Vallance discussed
the current operation of the DA-Notice system as follows:
‘Unique to Great Britain, this system emerged
at the end of the Cold War from the long estab-
lished “D Notice” system, which was widely
seen as a form of government censorship. The
present DA Notice system was shaped to meet
the very different conditions already emerging
in the 1990s, and was from the outset based on
consensus and shared responsibility between
government and the national media for the dis-
closure of national security information … 
Please note that these DA Notices have been
agreed by representatives of the UK govern-
ment and the UK media, are published in full
and can be accessed by the public on the
DPBAC’s website: www.dnotice.org.uk. They
are framed to permit sensible interpretation and
negotiation between journalists, authors and
editors on the one hand, and the DPBAC
Secretary on the other. They act as a societal
agreement between the UK government and the
media to share responsibility for the disclosure
of national security information, one which
upholds the media’s right to report in the public
interest but recognises it has an obligation to
ensure that the public is not damaged as a
result.
The two key supporting pillars of this very
British arrangement are confidentiality and
consent. Journalist and editors must have confi-
dence that when they seek DA Notice advice it
will not be used against them, or their story
passed on to competitors. Without that assur-
ance they would cease to seek advice and the
system would collapse.’50
Vallance continued his speech by noting that in order to
maintain this confidence on the part of the media, the
Committee had concluded that it should not be subject to
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Freedom of
Information Act Scotland (2002). As he said, ‘the continu-
ing effectiveness of the system relies on individual case-
work, and the advice offered … to government officials
and to members of the media and public remaining strictly
private.’ 51 The home page of the DA-Notice system web-
site makes reference to the fact that the DPBAC is not sub-
ject to the Acts, but says the Committee ‘is committed to
practising a policy of maximum disclosure of its activities’
while at the same time honouring ‘any assurance of confi-
dentiality given to the individuals and organisations with
which it deals’.52 The website itself is one means of pro-
viding maximum disclosure of its activities.
In 1997, in an interview with the author of this
article, the then secretary Rear Admiral David Pulvertaft
described his role as one of an ‘independent broker’
between the media and bureaucrats, and as being like
walking a tightrope. He regarded the regular twice yearly
meetings as one of the reasons for the survival of the
system. If either the media or the bureaucrats felt he was
not sufficiently looking after their interests they would use
that forum to say so and he would take note; this would
help to keep his approach even handed. Pulvertaft said he
tried only to prevent highly classified detail being pub-
lished rather than the whole story, so would suggest
amendments such as the changing of wording or the dele-
tion of a certain passage. The response to a request for
advice is either that the material is subject to a DA-Notice,
and in other cases the secretary does not give clearance but
instead makes a ‘no advice’ comment.
Another requirement for the continuing effectiveness
of the system is undoubtedly the public relations skills of
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the secretary. Comprehensive contact information for the
secretary is freely available on the website and there is a
willingness and enthusiasm to talk freely and openly about
the system. The website includes speeches by the previous
secretary Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson at events such as
the ‘Soho Writers’ Festival Civil Liberties Panel’ (2002),
the ‘Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom’
(2001) and the ‘Freedom Forum’ (2000).53 It is interesting
to note that in June 2005, about six months after his term
as secretary of the DPBAC finished, Wilkinson was
appointed as a public member to the Press Complaints
Commission. The public, or ‘lay’, members have no con-
nections to newspapers or magazines and are appointed by
an independent panel following public advertisement and
interview.54
Has anything changed?
At the outset it was stated that the purpose of this article is
to compare the operation of the DA-Notice system before
and after the events of September 11, 2001, including the
invasion of Iraq, to see if there are any differences. In
terms of the day to day operation of the system, surpris-
ingly little appears to have changed. The following are
consistent before and after: the DPBAC met twice a year,
the secretary deals with specific enquiries from the media
and there is a comprehensive website.
In his ‘Opening Remarks’ to the Soho Writers’
Festival Civil Liberties Panel on November 19, 2002, the
secretary Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson addressed the
issue of change directly:
‘How has September 11 last year changed the
D-Notice [sic] system? The answer may be the
only relatively good news you hear tonight. It is
that September 11 has changed nothing – the
standing D-Notices [sic] remain as before, and
I have very consciously ensured that the way I
interpret them has also remained unchanged. In
my perception, although we live in an unstable
and sometimes dangerous world, we also did so
before 9/11. We are certainly now more aware
of the threat from one particular direction, and
that threat is possibly more directly focussed on
us now because of our role since 9/11, but on
the other hand the intelligence and security ser-
vices are also now better organised to counter
it, even if no measures against terrorists can
ever be 100%, and an element of good luck is
needed. So the situation is not so significantly
more dangerous now that we need to go over-
board on new security measures, especially any
that greatly erode civil liberties.’55
However, while the operation of the DA-Notice system
itself has not changed, there are external forces that may in
the longer term render it ineffective because what is
indeed changing very quickly is the way in which news
and information is disseminated. As a result such informa-
tion enters the public domain far more rapidly and readily,
and this negates the purpose of the DA-Notice system
which is to keep information secret. The growth of the
internet had already started to have an effect before 2001,
and there had already been instances where material on the
internet had breached DA-Notices and the Official Secrets
Act 1989. For example, in May 1999 over one hundred
names of MI6 operatives were published on the internet,
allegedly by a former MI6 officer (who denied the accusa-
tion). As soon as the government persuaded the respective
internet service provider to shut down the offending web-
site, several mirror sites appeared elsewhere.56
Mobile phones can now take, send and receive
photographs and video clips, so any individual with a suit-
able mobile phone, or with a digital camera, can record on
the spot when newsworthy events happen. The material
can be uploaded onto the internet instantly, and is then vis-
ible to millions through websites such as www.utube.com,
with no reference to the DA-Notice system. While the
mainstream news organisations have a presence on the
internet, so do non mainstream news organisations, with
no reference to the DA-Notice system. Blogs abound, with
every conceivable type of information being discussed. In
August 2007 the Ministry of Defence banned service per-
sonnel from giving without permission any information
about military matters by blogging. ‘Personnel will also be
barred from playing multi-player computer games and
sending text messages, photographs and audio or video
material without permission if they relate to defence
matters’.57 This may now deter British forces from relay-
ing information, including photos and video clips, via the
internet or by mobile phone, especially if they are in war
zones. It does not, however, prevent civilians in those war
zones, or other combatants, from relaying information via
the internet, including photos and video clips, that
involves British forces.
As well as the above examples of where the internet
provides a rich source of information that may be prejudi-
cial to national security, the internet has sites that show-
case in astonishing detail aerial and satellite photography.
Google Earth is one of the foremost examples of this, but
there is also getmapping.com, which describes its product
as ‘the most comprehensive and detailed aerial photo-
graphic survey of the UK’, and www.secret-bases.co.uk.58
Critics have commented on how useful these aerial pic-
tures are to terrorists planning an attack, but the MD of
Getmapping, Tristram Cary, apparently obtained clear-
ance for the website from what is referred to as the ‘MoD’
both before and after September 11, 2001. Cary ‘pointed
out that there was also an “open skies” policy in the UK,
under which anyone could fly 3,000ft over sites and take
their own detailed photographs’.59 Secret Bases says that
the secretary of the DPBAC had no objections to that web-
site either.
The matter of Aerial and Satellite Photography was
included in the secretary’s report to the June 19, 2007
meeting of the DPBAC:
‘There had been a marked increase in enquiries
for advice on publishing aerial and satellite
photography during the last 7 months. The
Secretary reported that, given the ease of access
to web-sites such as Google Earth, little or
nothing that could now be seen and photo-
graphed from the air or from space could be
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regarded as anything other than widely avail-
able in the public domain. The ease of access-
ing aerial or satellite imagery had been factored
into DA Notice disclosure advice.’60
As a measure of how much this new material in the public
domain has changed the nature of the DA-Notice system,
Google Earth now makes it possible to see close up with
great clarity the Government Communication Head-
quarters (GCHQ) building outside Cheltenham. The very
existence of GCHQ was a secret and subject to a D-Notice
until 1977, and so it is a mark of different times when an
aerial photo of it appeared on the front cover of Cotswold
Life in June 2006. Google Earth was the subject of a CNN
Report entitled ‘Google views raise concerns’ on October
9, 2007 which centred on clearly visible sensitive sites in
Israel. This report also showed how it is possible for
Google Earth to conceal some specific sites when it
demonstrated how the house of Dick Cheney, the Vice
President of the United States, is pixillated into obscurity.61
Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to make a comparison of the
period before and after the events of 11 September 2001 to
see if there are any differences in the operation of the DA-
Notice system post 2001. The examination of the early
history demonstrates that over the years there were some
notable changes in the manner in which the system oper-
ated. However since 1993, when it became known as the
Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee
and the D-Notices became DA-Notices, the operation of
the system has remained relatively unchanged. Even fol-
lowing the events of 9/11 the operation of the system gives
the impression of being business as usual. This is despite
increased internal and external threats to national security
resulting from 9/11. It is also despite the impact of the 9/11
events on the mainstream media in terms of their ability to
freely disseminate information that may have national
security implications. While no changes are manifest, of
great significance is the change in the way in which infor-
mation is becoming available. This may be a greater cata-
lyst for change than anything hitherto.
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